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This chapter examines the implications of the current wave of globalization for the
pursuit of a human rights approach to development. It is now widely recognized
that broad-based development is not possible without empowering the people —
especially the poor. The human rights approach to development is essentially about
such empowerment. The notion that individuals have rights, which they can claim,
and that there are some actors who are obliged to meet those claims, is an im-
mensely empowering one. Once policy-making is required to conform to the
human rights framework, the rationale of development policies changes in a funda-
mental way. Policies are no longer driven merely by the recognition that people
have needs that ought to be fulfilled but that they have rights that entail legal obli-
gations on the part of the state and other relevant actors. 
In this approach, the nation states bear the primary obligation for ensuring that
the human rights are realized in full for everyone within their jurisdiction. The
question has arisen, however, about whether the wave of globalization that is cur-
rently sweeping the world weakens or strengthens the ability as well as incentives of
nation states to discharge their obligations. This question is the object of scrutiny
of this chapter.1
The central argument of the chapter is that there is nothing deterministic about
the impact of globalization on the ability or incentives of nation states to discharge
their human rights obligations. As in all spheres, globalization entails both con-
straints and opportunities, and much depends on how national and international
policies attempt to deal with them. The second section of the chapter scrutinizes
some of the potential constraints, and the third section examines potential oppor-
tunities. The fourth section lays out some principles that national policy-making
ought to follow in order to render globalization not only compatible with the
human rights approach to development but also conducive to it.2
Some Potential Constraints to the Human Rights 
Approach to Development in the Age of Globalization
In both popular and academic discussions, globalization is thought to pose a
number of constraints to the fuller realization of human rights — so much so, in
the opinion of some, that globalization is not deemed to be compatible with
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1 The definition of globalization can be quite elastic, going beyond economic integration of the world
to encompass political and cultural integration as well. This chapter focuses only on the economic di-
mension of globalization and its implications for the human rights approach to development. 
2 It is recognized that national-level policy-making must be supplemented by policies at the interna-
tional level in order to be fully effective, but limitation of space prevents an examination of the interna-
tional dimension of the human rights approach to development in this chapter.
human rights at all. This concern with a potential conflict between globalization
and human rights is scrutinized below in the context of three sets of issues. These
are (1) how the force of competition engendered by globalization might affect
workers’ rights, (2) how the drive towards liberalization of trade and capital flows
might undermine the fiscal powers of nation states to discharge their human rights
obligations, and (3) how changes in the structure of production and employment
induced by globalization might threaten the rights of the poorer and weaker seg-
ments of the society.
Globalization and Labor Standards: A “Race to the Bottom”?
One area where globalization is sometimes seen to be incompatible with, or
even inimical to, human rights is that of labor standards. The working class has
come a long way since the early days of the industrial revolution to secure various
rights through a long process of political struggle. The world community has come
to accept, at least in principle, that workers have certain fundamental human rights
that must guide their relationship with employers and governments. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) has defined them as core “labor stan-
dards,” which include (1) prohibition of forced labor, (2) freedom of association,
(3) the right to organize and bargain collectively, (4) elimination of the exploita-
tion of child labor, and (5) non-discrimination in employment. There are other
standards — related to wages, health and safety conditions, rules of dismissal,
among others — that are not treated as core but are nevertheless considered impor-
tant enough to be part of the conditions for “decent work.” The struggle to achieve
these rights is still incomplete — some of these rights have been achieved less than
others and workers in some countries have achieved them less than in others.
Globalization is seen by many to be an enemy of this struggle. It is feared that
globalization will not only stand in the way of fuller achievement of workers’ rights
but will actually cause a regression of rights by inducing governments to lower the
level of labor standards.
The basis of this fear lies in the force of competition unleashed by globaliza-
tion. As more and more nations begin to integrate with the world economy, they
will have to compete with each other ever more fiercely in order to survive and
prosper. It is feared that this intensification of competition might undermine labor
standards in at least two ways. First, since higher labor standards are likely to entail
higher cost of employing labor, countries wishing to compete in the world market
might let their standards fall to the level of competitors with lower standards in
order to keep their cost and prices competitive. Second, countries might be
tempted to lower their labor standards in order to attract foreign investors who
might otherwise go to countries where the standards are less stringent. Both these
compulsions — remaining competitive in the world market and attracting foreign
capital — might thus lead to a “race to the bottom” among countries as they en-
gage in a process of competitive degradation of labor standards.
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Although this fear has a superficial plausibility, theoretical arguments are by no
means unambiguous and the empirical evidence is far from supportive.3 There are
a number of reasons why higher labor standards need not erode competitiveness.
First, in a competitive labor market workers may have to trade off some cash re-
wards in order to achieve higher labor standards, in which case the overall cost of
labor need not rise for the employers. Second, in order to be competitive in the
world market and attractive to foreign capital, what matters is not just the cost of
employing labor but the relationship between cost and productivity of labor. Even
if a high level of labor standards entails higher costs, it may also help raise produc-
tivity — by boosting workers’ morale, incentive, loyalty, and sheer physical ability.
If the gain of productivity outweighs any rise in costs, higher labor standards will
not entail any loss of competitive advantage. Third, even if higher costs are not
matched by higher productivity, thereby forcing prices up, competitiveness will not
be lost if consumers are willing to pay a premium for the products produced under
better labor standards.
On the empirical front, too, there is no convincing evidence of any systematic
relationship between competitive advantage and labor standards. In a comparative
study across a large number of countries, Rodrik found no effect of labor standards
on a country’s competitiveness in the export market, after controlling for other fac-
tors (such as productivity and factor endowments) that have a bearing on exports.4
A study of imports into the US market from 10 major developing countries found
that countries with lower labor standards did not enjoy a higher share of the mar-
ket and that within those developing countries the more export-oriented firms en-
joyed higher or similar labor standards as compared with the less export-oriented
ones.5 In a similar vein, an Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) study concluded that “there is no evidence that lower stan-
dards countries enjoy a better global export performance than higher standards’
countries”).6 Thus, there is no reason to suspect, on the basis of existing evidence,
that the drive to gain competitiveness in the world market has induced a general
tendency to devalue labor standards.
The evidence on the relationship between labor standards and the direction of
foreign capital flow also provides no reason to support the “race to the bottom” hy-
pothesis. An analysis of US foreign direct investment in the 1980s found that
countries with a poorer record of civil and political rights in general and workers’
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Standards be Imposed Through International Trade Policy?” Policy Research Working Paper 1817
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997) and R. M. Stern, “Labour Standards and International Trade,”
Discussion Paper no. 430. Research Seminar in International Economics. (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan, 1998).
4 D. Rodrik “Labor Standards in International Trade: Do They Matter and What Do We Do About
Them?” in Robert Lawrence, Dani Rodrik, and John Whalley, Emerging Agenda for Global Trade: High
Stakes for Developing Countries. (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1996).
5 M. Aggarwal, “International Trade, Labor Standards, and Labor Market Conditions: An Evaluation
of the Linkages,” Working Paper 95-06-C (Washington, DC: US International Trade Commission, 1995).
6 OECD, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers’ Rights and
International Trade. (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996), p. 12.
rights in particular actually received less investment from the US than would have
been predicted by their other characteristics.7 In other studies, labor standards in
recipient countries were found to have no systematic relationship with the size of
foreign direct investment (FDI) coming from the USA8 and from the OECD
countries as a whole.9 In popular discussion, the link between foreign investment
and labor standards has focussed mainly on the so-called export processing zones
(EPZ), where labor standards, especially those relating to the right to collective
bargaining, sometimes tend to be poor. There is, however, no evidence that EPZs
with lower standards have in general succeeded in attracting more foreign capital
than those with higher standards. On the contrary, a recent study has concluded
that “Countries that pursue more integrated policy approaches for attracting ex-
port-oriented FDI — for example by encouraging tripartite representation (em-
ployers, workers and public authorities) on EPZ committees, guaranteeing workers’
rights (including freedom of association and collective bargaining), and upgrading
skills and working conditions — have tended to attract higher quality FDI).”10
Moreover, as a result of combined efforts of the ILO, workers’ associations and
civil society organisations, labor standards seem to be improving in several EPZs
over time rather than going down.11
The point of all this is not to deny that some countries may sometimes be
tempted to compromise on their labor standards in the hope of stealing a march
over others. Rather the point is that deliberate and competitive degradation of
workers’ rights is neither an inescapable consequence nor a general tendency of
countries trying to integrate with the world economy.
Fiscal Autonomy of Nation States
One of the essential features of globalization is liberalization of trade and capi-
tal flows that helps integrate an economy more closely with the global economy.
Trade liberalization involves elimination or at least substantial reduction of trade
barriers such as tariffs and quotas. Tariff reduction, however, has consequences not
just for trade flows but also for government budgets. In most developing countries,
the domestic base of revenue collection is rather skimpy, and governments tend to
rely heavily on tariffs on internationally traded goods as a major and, in some
cases, the most important source of budgetary revenue. Trade liberalization might,
therefore, entail considerable loss of revenue for the government. Something simi-
lar may happen with the liberalization of capital flows. Governments may be
tempted to reduce taxes on the income earned by foreign capital in order to induce
foreign investors to come to their shores in preference to other countries. The re-
sulting loss of revenue may seriously constrain the government’s ability to under-
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take essential expenditures that directly or indirectly help realize the human rights
of the people, by ensuring better access to food, health, education, and so on.
Apart from possible loss of revenue, there is another way in which free flow of
capital may constrain a government’s fiscal powers. Governments in developing
countries often resort to deficit financing in order to carry out expenditures that
cannot be financed fully by the small amount of revenues they can manage to col-
lect. Deficit financing, however, can lead to inflation, which in turn can lead to
pressures for depreciation of the currency in the foreign exchange market. Any
such pressure for depreciation is bound to be viewed with concern by foreign in-
vestors, as a depreciated currency would mean a fall in the real value of their assets
and income. Foreign capital would, therefore, tend to shy away from countries
whose governments have a propensity to indulge in excessive deficit financing. As a
result, if a government is keen to keep foreign capital within its shores, it would be
seriously constrained in taking recourse to deficit financing.
Liberalization of trade and capital flows may thus limit a government’s ability to
undertake desired expenditures by reducing the amount of revenue on the one
hand and constraining the use of deficit financing on the other.12 It is conceivable
that this will impair a government’s ability to undertake fiscal expenditures that are
essential for better realization of human rights.
It is important, however, to recognize that the fiscal constraint is not an in-
evitable consequence of globalization. There are a number of reasons for avoiding
excessive pessimism in this regard. The first point to note is that many aspects of
fuller realization of human rights do not make any substantial demand on budget-
ary resources. In this context, it is useful to note a three-fold classification of State
obligations that has been discussed extensively in the human rights literature —
namely, the obligation to respect, the obligation to protect, and the obligation to ful-
fill human rights.
The obligation to respect entails that the State must not do anything that would
violate the rights of people. In the civil and political sphere, this means for example
that the State must not deny people their freedom of speech, or must not put them
into jail without following the due process of law, and so on. In the economic
sphere, it means for example that the State must not deny any individual or group
access to their means of livelihood, or to health care, or to education, etc. 
The obligation to respect is a kind of negative obligation — it specifies what the
State must not do. The other two obligations are positive in nature — they specify
what the States must do. To obligation to protect emanates from the possibility that
even though the State itself may not violate the rights of anyone, some third party
might try to do so. The State in that case has an obligation to protect those whose
rights are being violated or being threatened by others. For example, if an oppres-
DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHT 5
12 See B. Khatri and M. Rao, “Fiscal Faus Pas? An Analysis of the Revenue Implications of Trade
Liberalization,” World Development 30(8), 2002, and B. Khatri,“Trade Liberalization and the Fiscal
Squeeze: Implications for Public Investment,” Development and Change 34(3), 2003, on the analytical
and empirical issues regarding the impact of liberalization on revenues and expenditure of governments
in the developing countries.
sive landlord is violating a tenant farmer’s right to food by unlawfully evicting him
from the only piece of land on which the latter’s subsistence depends, then the
State must protect the farmer by taking appropriate punitive actions on the 
landlord. 
The third and final obligation — namely, the obligation to fulfill rights — is
subdivided into two parts — to facilitate and to provide. The obligation to facilitate
means that the State must proactively engage in activities that would strengthen
people’s ability to meet their own needs. For example, while it is true that every in-
dividual must be responsible for maintaining his or her own health, the State has
an obligation to facilitate this process either by creating the conditions in which
market can supply the healthcare demanded by the people, or, in case the market
fails, by supplying it through the State machinery. 
The obligation to provide goes one step further. It requires the State not just
create the conditions in which people would be able to provide for themselves but
actually transfer the necessary resources to those who for one reason or another
cannot provide for themselves. Thus, the State must directly provide food when-
ever an individual or a group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to pro-
vide for themselves the food they need (for example, the old and the infirm, people
displaced by wars or natural disasters, and so on).
One of the distinctions among these different categories of obligations is that
not all of them are equally dependent on the availability of resources. For instance,
the “respect” obligations with regard to most rights would require political will
more than economic resources. The “protect” and “fulfill” obligations would typi-
cally be more dependent on resources, but even there rapid progress can be made
by improving the efficiency of resource use — for example, by scaling down expen-
diture on unproductive activities and by reducing spending on activities whose
benefit goes disproportionately to the privileged groups of the society. Very often
when governments plead inability to realize human rights because of resource con-
straint the real problem is not so much the lack of resources as such but the
propensity to waste resources and to pander to powerful vested interests. If global-
ization can pressure delinquent governments to cut down on such wasteful use of
resources by constraining their fiscal powers, that won’t be such a bad thing for the
cause of human rights after all.
This is not to deny that there is no genuine problem of resource constraint that
stands in the way of full realization of human rights in most developing countries.
Even after wasteful expenditures have been cut to the minimum, it is still possible
that governments will not have enough resources at their disposal to discharge their
human rights obligations fully. In that case, any curtailment of fiscal powers will
have to be viewed with concern. It is, therefore, important to consider whether,
and to what extent, globalization is actually likely to constrain the fiscal autonomy
of developing countries.
There are a number of reasons to suspect that the fear about globalization’s im-
pact on fiscal powers may be grossly exaggerated. Consider first the effect of tariff
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reduction. What typically happens in the course of trade liberalization is not a sud-
den drop to zero tariff across the board but a change from a regime of high and
variable tariff rates to a regime of low and relatively uniform rates. The average rate
of tariff invariably goes down as a result, but this does not necessarily mean that
total tariff revenue must go down as well. This is because the tax base tends to ex-
pand at the same time. 
First, since tariff reduction leads to greater volume of trade, total tariff revenue
may increase even if the average rate goes down, depending on price elasticities of
import and export. Secondly, since trade liberalization typically involves replacing
quantitative restrictions on imports by tariff restriction (the so-called tariffication
of quotas), many more commodities get subjected to tariff payments than before.
As a result, there can be no general presumption that trade liberalization will neces-
sarily lead to a loss of revenue. A similar argument applies to the liberalization of
capital flows. Even if a government reduces the income tax rate in order to attract
foreign capital, total tax revenue may still increase if the inflow of foreign capital
rises enough to generate more than proportionate increase in income by employing
such capital to productive use.
It is also important to note that the revenue impact of trade liberalization can-
not be judged simply from the effect on tariff revenue because tariffs may be re-
placed by other taxes. The problem with tariff is that it is a discriminatory tax —
that is, it discriminates against imports compared with domestic goods. Such dis-
criminatory taxes distort the incentive structure and thereby induce economic inef-
ficiency.13 That is why trade liberalization, whose objective is to improve economic
efficiency, requires the reduction and eventual elimination of tariffs. But this objec-
tive does not require elimination of taxes on imports altogether. It is perfectly ad-
missible to replace tariff with a tax that is neutral between imported and domestic
goods. Such a tax would continue to raise revenue from imports — as well as from
domestic goods — while being perfectly consistent with the principle of trade lib-
eralization. Total tax revenue may not thus fall, and may in fact increase, even if
tariff revenue falls. Therefore, if a government is concerned about the revenue ef-
fect of trade liberalization, it has the option of imposing such a neutral tax (such as
the value-added tax). 
Clearly, then, the fiscal constraint impact of globalization cannot be taken for
granted. Governments are not entirely helpless in this matter. They have policy op-
tions available at their disposal that may in fact enhance their fiscal powers. These
options include tariffication of quotas, setting the average rate of tariff at a level
that avoids serious loss of tariff revenue, replacing tariffs with neutral taxes, and
generally improving the efficiency of revenue collection, which happens to be
pretty low in developing countries. To what extent developing countries are actu-
ally making use of these policy instruments along with their attempt at trade liber-
alization is not yet known — research on this topic is still very limited. But there is
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some evidence to support the argument that trade liberalization can go hand in
hand with improved fiscal powers provided appropriate policy options are adopted. 
The experience of Bangladesh is instructive in this regard.14 Bangladesh
adopted sweeping measures of trade liberalization in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Tariff revenues as a proportion of GDP have fallen slightly as a result, but
total revenue from imported goods has not. This is because the government of
Bangladesh partially replaced tariffs with the neutral value-added tax (VAT) in
1992, applied uniformly on domestic and imported goods. On the domestic front,
the new replaced the old-style excise duties, and on the import front it (partly) re-
placed customs duties and sales tax on imports. In addition, the government intro-
duced the so-called Supplementary Duty, which is also meant to be imposed
equally on import and domestic production.
As a result of these tax reforms, the overall collection of indirect taxes did not
actually suffer in Bangladesh following trade liberalization. As a proportion of
GDP, total revenue from indirect taxes in fact increased from 4.6 percent in the
late 1980s to 5.6 percent in the first half of the 1990s and further to 6.3 percent in
the second half of the decade.
Increased revenue from indirect taxes has been supplemented by a move to-
wards better collection of direct taxes that proved quite successful up to the mid-
1990s (but tapered off since then). As a result, total revenue as a percentage of
GDP went up from 6.3 percent in the second half of the 1980s to 9.2 percent in
the second half of the 1990s. Correspondingly, public expenditure as a percentage
of GDP also went up — from 12.9 percent to 13.6 percent of GDP. While this in-
crease is quite small, it is significant that it happened despite a secular decline in
the inflow of foreign aid during the same period. Finally, it is worth noting that
the share of public expenditure going to sectors that benefit the poor proportion-
ately more — such as health, education, and basic infrastructure — has also in-
creased. For instance, the combined share of health and education in total
budgetary expenditure has gone up from 14 percent in the first half of the 1980s
to 23 percent in the second half of the 1990s While the evidence from a single
country is by no means conclusive, this is enough to make the point that there is
nothing inevitable about globalization making it harder for governments to dis-
charge their human rights obligations by constraining their fiscal powers. Much de-
pends on the details of the policy package that is implemented in the course of
liberalization.
Winners and Losers from Structural Change
Integration with the global economy inevitably brings about structural changes
within an economy, opening up new opportunities for enhancing employment and
income but also closing down, or at least diminishing, many existing means of
livelihood. To use economic jargon, opportunities open up in those activities in
which a country has comparative advantage, and diminish in those in which it has
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comparative disadvantage. All this may have profound implications for pursuing
the human rights approach to development.
Economic theory suggests that generally speaking gains will outweigh losses, so
that a nation as a whole should gain in the form of an overall increase in welfare.
The problem, however, is that gains and losses may not be distributed evenly across
the population. Much depends on who happens to be engaged in the expanding
activities and who in the contracting ones, and who has the skills and other means
of access to the new opportunities that are being opened up. Evidence as well as
common sense suggests that losses will generally be felt disproportionately more by
the weaker segments of the society. They would suffer more simply because they
lack the flexibility to cope with the changing winds of market forces owing to the
various impediments they face in accessing new skills and resources. There is a real
danger that some of them might face a reversal in the achievement of a range of
human rights such as the rights to food, work, health, and shelter. This is one rea-
son for concern regarding the compatibility of globalization with human rights.
While recognizing that globalization has the potential to make some of the
poor more vulnerable in the face of changing structure of opportunities, it is neces-
sary, however, to avoid excessive alarmism in this regard. A couple of points are
worth noting here.
First, it is often suggested almost in an axiomatic fashion that globalization has
widened income inequality in the world, which is seen as prima facie evidence for
the view that the poor have been hurt by the process. However, quite apart from
the fact that widening inequality can easily go in hand with absolute improvement
in the living conditions of the poor, the very notion that globalization has widened
inequality is deeply problematic. The empirical evidence on what has happened to
income distribution in the world in the current phase of globalization is inconclu-
sive.15,16 More importantly, no one has yet found a satisfactory way of separating
out the effect of globalization from the effects of other factors that might have a
bearing on income distribution in the world.
In any case, even if it can be shown that globalization has indeed contributed to
widening of inequality in the world, it does not follow that globalization must nec-
essarily do so. In the 1950s and 1960s, it used to be believed that when a backward
economy begins to develop along the capitalist line income distribution necessarily
worsens at the initial stage, before improving much later. Known as the Kuznets
hypothesis, this belief has now come to be belied by empirical evidence. What hap-
pens to income distribution at any stage of development depends very much on
the nature of policies pursued by governments. With appropriate policies, distribu-
tion can actually improve as an economy grows — there is nothing inevitable
about the Kuznets hypothesis. The same is true in principle about the effect of
globalization. Policies — at both national and international level — can make a
difference. As will be argued below, this is precisely the reason for taking the
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human rights approach to development even more seriously in the age of globaliza-
tion.
The second point to bear in mind is that even without globalization structural
changes do occur in any economy except in the most moribund ones. Owing to
changes in technology, tastes, demographic structure, and so on, new opportunities
open up in the sphere of production and old ones close down all the time. The ef-
fects of these home-grown structural changes are not qualitatively dissimilar to those
induced by globalization. They too create new uncertainties and vulnerabilities along
with new opportunities, and in this case too the cost of negative effects tends to fall
disproportionately more on the weaker segments of the population, and for much
the same reasons. If this is not seen as a reason for avoiding structural changes in gen-
eral, it should not be seen as a reason for shutting the door to globalization either.
There is, however, a very good reason for being especially concerned with the pos-
sible negative effects of globalization and for trying to do something about it. The
problem is that unlike home-grown structural changes, which typically unfold incre-
mentally over a long haul allowing a breathing space for necessary adjustments, the
current phase of globalization is bringing about sweeping structural changes within a
short period of time. The sheer pace of change can entail serious problems of adjust-
ment, especially when it comes to setting up an adequate social protection scheme
for those suffering most from the disruptions caused by structural changes. What is
worse, this problem can be compounded by two other factors.
One of these can be described as the problem of shifting comparative advantage.
As noted earlier, when a country integrates with the world economy, the structure of
production begins to shift away from activities with comparative disadvantage to-
wards those with comparative advantage. The problem, however, is that structural
changes caused by this shift may not be a once-for-all affair because the nature of
comparative advantage may itself undergo rapid change during the process of global-
ization. Comparative advantage, it must be remembered, is inherently comparative in
nature – that is, it depends not just on the characteristics of a particular country but
also on those of other countries that participate in a trading network. As a result, any
country that has already embraced globalization may find that its comparative advan-
tage keeps changing as the net of globalization spreads, bringing in new countries
within the trading network. Thus, countries such as Malaysia and Taiwan have dis-
covered to their dismay that the comparative advantage they have enjoyed in labor-
intensive garment industries for a number of years was suddenly eroded as
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam enter the export market with even cheaper
labor. Similarly, the Latin American countries that once found comparative advantage
in labor-intensive activities when they first embraced globalization now find that they
no longer have comparative advantage in those activities as populous countries such
as China and India have entered the scene. In each case, a country that loses compar-
ative advantage in one sphere will eventually find it elsewhere. But the problem is
that shifting comparative advantage of this kind can keep the structure of an econ-
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omy in a constant state of flux for a prolonged period of time.17 The disruptive ef-
fects of globalization may, therefore, be quite serious.
The other problem stems from the erratic behavior of international finance.
One of the presumed gains from globalization is that free flow of capital will en-
sure efficient use of resources by moving finance from regions with low marginal
rate of return to regions with higher returns. In reality, however, capital does not
always behave in such efficient manner because of various kinds of market failures
arising from imperfect and asymmetric knowledge that is inherent in capital mar-
kets. In the absence of perfect knowledge, flow of capital in and out of countries is
often guided by “herd behavior,” as an initial move by some investor is blindly imi-
tated by hordes of others. The magnitudes of capital movement can thus be quite
out of proportions with the underlying rates of return. In that case, what should
have been an orderly and limited movement of capital becomes a stampede, plung-
ing a country into a crisis that is deeper than what it probably deserved in terms of
its economic fundamentals. Even the direction of flow can sometimes be erratic,
for example, when the “contagion effect” takes hold — that is, when capital moves
out of a country not necessarily because anything is fundamentally wrong with it
but because some other country of similar type is experiencing a crisis. The series
of financial crises that rocked Asia and Latin America in the past decade and a half
bear clear hallmarks of such erratic behavior of international finance.
This is not to suggest that the countries that experienced crises did not get
many of their economic policies seriously wrong or that they didn’t need to bring
about fundamental structural changes in their economies in order to make them
more efficient. They generally did, but it is also undeniable that the erratic move-
ment of international finance forced some additional structural changes that were
not needed on efficiency grounds and were probably quite harmful (for example,
when drying up of capital forced even potentially efficient activities to be closed
down).18 Many of these uncalled for changes were probably reversed as the coun-
tries emerged out of crises and international finance resumed business as usual. But
the harm done during the crisis in terms of unnecessary human sufferings caused
by disruptions and dislocations, not all of which were efficiency enhancing, was
real and extremely painful. 
Globalization can thus have both an accentuating and a distorting effect on
structural changes, even though some of these changes would in any case occur in
an economy even without it. The potential for creating new uncertainties and vul-
nerabilities (along with new opportunities) is, therefore, correspondingly greater in
the context of globalization than without. As such, the potential for hurting the
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weaker segments of the population is also greater in the age of globalization, unless
conscious efforts are made to protect them.19
This is where the human rights approach to development can play a vitally im-
portant role. The international human rights normative framework has a particular
pre-occupation with individuals and groups that are vulnerable, marginal, disad-
vantaged, or socially excluded. That is why it can act as an effective counterweight
to the disruptive effects of globalization whose burden is likely to fall dispropor-
tionately on these very categories of people. Two elements of the international
human rights normative framework are especially relevant here. These are the twin
principles of non-discrimination and equality and the principle of non-retrogres-
sion of rights.
The principles of non-discrimination and equality are among the most funda-
mental elements of international human rights law. These are elaborated in numer-
ous human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the two International Covenants on civil-political rights and economic-so-
cial-cultural rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child. Recognizing the fundamental importance of these twin principles,
the international community has established two treaty bodies, under ICERD and
CEDAW, that are devoted exclusively to the promotion and protection of non-dis-
crimination and equality.
If left unattended, the uneven burden of adjustments to globalization can fall
foul of the principles of non-discrimination and equality. The problem is not just
that globalization will not have a neutral or uniform effect on everyone in the soci-
ety — no policy or economic change can be expected to have such an ideal effect.
The problem arises when there is a systematic bias against some groups or individ-
uals. If the adverse effects of a policy or economic change were to be distributed
randomly among the population, the question of discrimination would not arise.
But this is unlikely to be the case. Since the brunt of the burden is likely to be
borne by the weaker segments of the population, the possibility of discrimination
is very real. Two considerations are important to bear in mind in this context. 
First, it needs to be recognized that discrimination and inequality may take
many different forms and stem from many different sources. They may arise from
explicit legal inequalities in status and entitlements. But they can also arise from
policies that disregard the needs of particular people, or from social values that
shape relationships within households and communities in a manner that discrimi-
nates against particular groups of people. Second, it is important to look at the ef-
fects of policies, not just intentions. For example, if the effect of a policy regime is
to impoverish disproportionately women, or indigenous peoples, or some other
marginalized group, it is prima facie discriminatory, even if the policy-makers had
no intention of discriminating against the group in question.
Adherence to the human rights approach to development will, therefore, re-
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quire that those who are systematically hurt by the disruptions caused by globaliza-
tion be accorded special attention. In particular, efforts will have to be made to
equip them with the skills and resources necessary to take advantage of the new
opportunities being opened up by structural changes and to remove the impedi-
ments they face in getting access to productive employment so that their loss from
adjustments can be minimised and the scope for gaining from new opportunities
maximized. 
The principle of non-retrogression of rights can also play a vitally protective
role for the vulnerable people. This principle states that nobody should be allowed
to suffer an absolute decline in the enjoyment of any right at any time. The human
rights approach to development acknowledges that full enjoyment of all the rights
may only be possible over a period of time, and that as time passes some rights
may be advanced faster than others.20 But it does not permit the level of enjoy-
ment of any right to decline in comparison with the past. Globalization can clearly
lead to a violation of this principle if the rapid and overlapping structural changes
it brings about lead to such a serious disruption that the weak and vulnerable indi-
viduals suffer an absolute decline in their living standard. Such a decline clearly oc-
curred in a spectacular manner for a large number of people during the financial
crises of the recent past. But even in normal times, many individuals and groups
have suffered a decline in living standards in a manner that was perhaps less spec-
tacular but no less real for them. The human rights approach to development de-
mands that an adequate social protection scheme be put in place to prevent such a
decline. 
Globalization and Growth: Opportunities for 
the Human Rights Approach to Development
Globalization not only entails potential constraints to the quicker realization of
human rights, it also creates new opportunities — principally by helping to pro-
mote faster rate of economic growth. Just as the constraints that are only potential
can be handled with appropriate policy response, the opportunity that growth cre-
ates is also potential — one that must be harnessed in the service of human rights
with the support of the right kind of policies and institutions. Some of the princi-
ples that must underlie the supportive regime of policies and institutions are dis-
cussed below. At this point, we first elaborate on the links between globalization,
growth, and human rights. 
In much of the traditional discourse on human rights as well as a large part of
the development discourse, economic growth tends to be viewed with a good deal
of suspicion. This is not entirely surprising in view of the fact that many enthusi-
asts of economic growth tend to be so obsessed with it as to almost disregard the
adverse human consequences of wrong kinds of economic growth. But one needs
to distinguish between economic growth in general and wrong kinds of economic
growth in particular. The kind of growth that either neglects, or, worse still, cur-
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tails and violates human rights has, of course, no place in the human rights ap-
proach to development. But that does not mean that the need for economic
growth can be neglected by this approach. The power of economic growth can and
should be harnessed for the speedy realization of the right to development. 
One could even argue that economic growth is not just compatible with the
human rights approach but is an integral part of it. One of the salient features of
the human rights approach to development is the recognition that the existence of
resource constraint might call for progressive realization of rights over a period of
time. But in order that the leeway offered by the idea of progressive realization
does not induce the duty-holders to relax their efforts, the human rights approach
also requires that measures be taken to fully realize all the rights “as expeditiously
as possible.” Once the speed of realization of rights is accorded due importance, it
is easy to see why rapid economic growth is essential for the human rights ap-
proach to development. The point is made most forcefully by Sengupta:21 “It is of
course possible, by reallocation and redistribution of existing resources, to improve
the realization of some of the rights, separately and individually, for a limited pe-
riod and to a limited extent, without economic growth . . . However, it must be
recognized that all rights, including civil and political rights, involve using re-
sources to expand the supply of the corresponding goods and services and, possibly,
public expenditure. Therefore, if all or most of these rights have to be realized fully
and together and in a sustainable manner, steps have to be taken to relax the re-
source constraint by ensuring economic growth.” In short, since realization of
rights involves resources, speedy realization of rights calls for softening the resource
constraint, which in turn calls for economic growth. 
A related reason why growth is essential for the pursuit of a right-based ap-
proach to development is that it will ease the pain of making trade-offs among
rights. The idea of trade-offs among rights sits uneasily with the notion of indivisi-
bility of rights, which has a hallowed position in the literature on human rights.
Strictly speaking, however, trade-offs need not be inconsistent with indivisibility of
rights when one recognizes that there are actually two kinds of trade-offs one can
think of. One kind of trade-off refers to actually reducing the level of some kind of
right from the existing level in order to raise the level of some other right. This no-
tion of trade-offs is obviously incompatible with indivisible rights. 
But there is another kind of trade-off that is not only compatible with the no-
tion of indivisibility but also unavoidable. When a government is trying to im-
prove the levels of various rights under resource constraint, it is necessarily faced
with the choice of allocating scarce resources among alternative rights. We can ei-
ther spend more on the improvement of right X and less on right Y, or the other
way round. But if we do decide to spend a bit more on X, we necessarily decide to
spend a bit less on Y — that’s the trade-off. In this case, however, no single right
needs be diminished compared to the existing situation, and yet there is a trade-off
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in terms of how much improvement we can achieve in some right relative to some
other. This kind of trade-off at the margin — which might be called incremental
trade-off — is unavoidable in a world of scarce resources, which is the real world
we live in. 
Incremental trade-offs do not violate the principle of indivisibility of rights be-
cause they do not require that the level of any particular right be diminished from
the existing level in order to promote another nor do they require that promotion
of some right be put completely on hold while trying to advance another.
Nonetheless, they do present painful choices to the policy-makers who might be
keen to improve rapidly the realization of all rights at the same time but unable to
do so because of resource constraint. In this situation, faster rate of growth will
help ease the pain of making unavoidable trade-offs by making more resources
available.
A strategy for promoting economic growth must, therefore, constitute an inte-
gral part of the human rights approach to development. Globalization can be a
powerful ally in this regard because of its growth-promoting potential.22
There is, of course, no guarantee that by embracing globalization a country will
automatically accelerate the rate of growth. Things can go wrong for many reasons.
Some of these reasons could be external — such as collapse of the international fi-
nancial system; but many could be internal — such as poor governance, civil war,
deteriorating environment, and so on. Other things remaining the same, however,
globalization will enhance the growth potential by bringing about a more efficient
allocation of resources, by fostering competition, and by spurring technological dif-
fusion. This potential must be harnessed for advancing the cause of human rights.
It must be realized, however, that ensuring faster growth is one thing and har-
nessing its potential for the cause of human rights is quite another. All that growth
does is to make it easier to advance the human rights approach to development —
by speeding up progressive realization of rights and by easing the pain of unavoid-
able trade-offs. But it does not ensure that the realization of human rights will in
fact be advanced for the simple reason that the resources made available by growth
may not actually be used for the purpose of promoting rights.
For growth to be an ally of human rights, any strategy of growth must be em-
bedded in a comprehensive framework of policies and institutions that is con-
sciously designed to convert resources into rights. The precise details of policies
and institutions will, of course, vary from one situation to another, but some gen-
eral principles can be derived from the normative framework laid down by the in-
ternational law of human rights. The more important among these principles are
elaborated below.
The Principles of the Human Rights 
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Approach to Development
In order to delineate the major principles of the human rights approach to de-
velopment, it is first necessary to appreciate what exactly is demanded by the
human rights norms — that is, what goals they set and what obligations they en-
tail about how to go about realising those goals. 
Any approach to development must be underpinned by some set of values and
norms, whether explicit or not. The human rights approach to development is
based on an explicit framework of norms and values — one that has been univer-
sally accepted and codified through a series of international covenants, treaties,
declarations, and conventions. To begin with, this approach adopts a particular
view of what constitutes development. This is best exemplified by the following
formulation of the concept of the “right to development” recently adopted by the
international community. “The Right to Development is an inalienable human
right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to partici-
pate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political develop-
ment, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully
realized.”23
This formulation clearly implies that development is to be defined broadly as
“economic, social, cultural and political development,” in which “all human rights
and fundamental freedoms” can be fully realized. The human rights approach thus
demands broadening the concept of development from the narrowly economic one
that has dominated much of the development literature in the past. The narrow
concept of economic development still remains important, but it is no longer
enough. Development must entail fuller realization of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights on the one hand and civil and political rights on the other. By postulat-
ing that the pursuit of one set of rights to the neglect of others does not constitute
development, this concept of development thus embraces the notion of “indivisi-
bility of rights,” which the human rights community has long championed.24
The human rights approach not only offers a comprehensive notion of develop-
ment, but it also lays out a number of principles that must guide the policies and
institutions to be designed for promoting development. For convenience of exposi-
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tion, these principles may be classified into three categories: (1) those informing
the process of policy formulation, (2) those shaping the content of policies, and (3)
those guiding the monitoring of policy implementation.25
The Rights-Based Process of Policy Formulation
One of the most important principles of the human rights approach to policy
formulation is that it should be participatory in nature. In particular, the popula-
tion groups that are affected directly or indirectly by a particular policy should be
able to play an effective role in the process of formulating that policy. One may
distinguish four stages of participation: preference revelation; policy choice; imple-
mentation; and monitoring, assessment and accountability.
The stage of preference revelation is the initial stage of any process of policy for-
mulation. Before policies can be formulated, people must be enabled to express
what their preferences are, i.e. what objectives they want to achieve. The stage of
policy choice refers to the stage at which policies are formulated and decisions taken
regarding the allocation of resources among alternative uses. As different patterns
of resource allocation will serve the interests of different groups of people differ-
ently, a conflict of interest is inherent in any process of policy formulation.
Traditionally, the poor and the marginalized groups lose out in this process, as they
do not possess enough political or financial power to make their interests count.
The human rights approach must take steps to alter this situation by creating a
legal-institutional framework in which these groups can participate effectively in
policy formulation.
Opportunities must be created to enable the people to exercise their right to
participate in the implementation stage as well, even though implementation of
policies is primarily the responsibility of the executive arm of the State. The final
stage of participation is the stage of monitoring and assessment of the success or fail-
ure of policies so that the State and other duty-bearers can be held accountable for
their obligations.26
For genuine participation to be possible some preconditions must be met and
certain other rights must be fulfilled. The essential precondition is that the ordi-
nary people must be empowered to claim their rights and to participate effectively
in the decision-making process. The process of empowerment can itself be quite
complex and time-consuming because of the deep-rooted nature of the asymme-
tries of power that exist in most societies. 
To begin with, the character of the polity must be democratic in nature.
Though by no means sufficient, democratic governance is a necessary condition for
creating a space in which all groups of people can effectively participate in national
decision-making processes. The second precondition is to strengthen the bargain-
ing power of the marginalized groups so that they are able to participate effectively
in potentially conflictual situations. Capacity-building activities are also essential
for this purpose, and civil society can play a very constructive role in this sphere.
DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHT 17
26 The issue of accountability is discussed further below.
For this to be possible, the State must create the necessary legal and institutional
environment in which an independent civil society can flourish. In turn, the cre-
ation of such an environment requires simultaneous efforts to promote a range of
civil and political rights. These include the right to information, the right to free-
dom of expression, the right of association, and the right of equal access to justice.
Without the fulfillment of these rights, empowerment is not possible; and without
empowerment, effective participation is not possible. Therefore, taking measures to
fulfill these rights is an essential component of the human rights approach to de-
velopment.
Principles Shaping the Contents of Policies 
Under the Human Rights Approach
The contents of policies refer to the goals and targets that are set by the State,
the resources that are committed for the realization of those targets, and the meth-
ods that are adopted to achieve them. It is recognized that setting targets and com-
mitting resources for them will necessarily involve setting priorities, which in turn
will involve considering trade-off among alternative goals. These acts of setting pri-
orities and accepting trade-offs must necessarily involve some value judgements.
For a policy regime to be consistent with the human rights approach, these value
judgements must be shaped by the human rights norms. This has several implica-
tions for the characteristics of policy contents.
First, the goals and targets set by the State must conform to those set by various
human rights instruments and elaborated by the relevant treaty bodies. 
Second, policies must take cognisance of people’s rights to equality and non-
discrimination, which are among the most fundamental tenets of international
human rights law. 
The third set of principles relates to the possible trade-offs among rights. The
existence of resource constraint that gives rise to the idea of progressive realization
of rights also makes it inevitable that policy-makers will have to face trade-offs
among alternative rights — that is, some rights may have to be given priority over
others — because all rights cannot be fulfilled at the same time or at the same
pace. While the human rights approach recognizes the inevitability of trade-offs, it
also imposes certain conditions on it.
The first condition is imposed by the principle of indivisibility of rights, which
demands that no human right can be considered intrinsically inferior to any other.
If a certain right is to be given priority, it can only be done on practical grounds —
for example, because a certain right has remained historically more under-realized
than others, or because it is likely to act as a catalyst towards the speedy fulfillment
of others, and so on.
Another condition is imposed by the principle of non-retrogression of rights —
the idea that no right can be deliberately allowed to suffer an absolute decline in its
level of realization. This condition implies that, while allocating more resources to
the rights that have been accorded priority at any given point in time, care must be
taken to ensure that the rest of the rights maintain at least their initial level of real-
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ization. 
Finally, the priorities and trade-offs must be decided in a genuinely participa-
tory manner, so that interests and values of the weaker segments of the society do
not get lost through the pressure of powerful interest groups.
The Human Rights Approach Towards 
Monitoring of Policy Implementation
Monitoring and evaluation of performance is a necessary part of any kind of
development strategy, whether rights-based or otherwise. But the characteristic fea-
ture of the human rights approach is that it emphasises the notion of accountabil-
ity in a way that traditional approaches do not. 
The very notion of rights implies the notion of duties or obligations. But a
duty can only be meaningful if the duty-bearer can be held accountable for failing
to perform its duty. The need to ensure accountability is, therefore, centrally im-
portant for the human rights approach to development. 
There must exist mechanisms through which the culpability of the State can be
ascertained in case of failure to adopt and implement appropriate policies and so
that sanctions can be imposed if it is indeed found culpable. These accountability
mechanisms can be of various kinds — judicial, administrative, community-based,
and so on. It must be noted that holding the duty-bearers to account does not nec-
essarily imply taking recourse to the court of law. There can be both judicial and
non-judicial means of accountability — the latter might involve quasi-judicial (for
example, ombudsman, treaty bodies), political (for example, parliamentary
process), administrative, and civil society institutions. The human rights approach
to development would require the setting up of an appropriate mix of accountabil-
ity mechanisms. Each State must decide for itself which accountability mechanisms
are most appropriate in its particular case, but all mechanisms must be accessible,
transparent, and effective. Most importantly, accountability procedures must be
participatory in nature so that people are able to hold the State accountable for its
actions.
Once these principles are accepted as the foundation of policy-making for all-
round development of the society, it should be possible to harness the forces of
globalization for advancing the cause of human rights and to guard against any ad-
verse consequences.
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